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The National Energy Board of Canada (NEB), a federal
energy regulator, has implemented a management system audit
program as a tool to verify compliance with its predominantly
goal-oriented Onshore Pipeline Regulations, 1999  (OPR) [1].
The OPR allow individual companies to choose the most
effective way to manage their pipeline systems.  The audit
program is based on expected elements that the NEB believes
are necessary to meet the goals of the OPR.
This paper will explain why these audits and expected
elements are necessary and describe how goal-oriented
regulations will enhance pipeline safety.  The audits conducted
to date have identified several challenges that the NEB and
pipeline companies face in pursuit of the goal of safe pipelines;
these will be described and possible solutions will be proposed.
The overall objective of the paper is to explain the benefits of
using a management system approach to direct a company’s
pipeline integrity management program and what is required of
companies to meet the expectations of the NEB.
BACKGROUND
One of the NEB’s four goals is to ensure that its regulated
facilities are safe and perceived to be safe.  One means of
achieving this goal is the promulgation of the Onshore Pipeline
Regulations, 1999  (OPR) [1].  These Regulations, which came
into effect on August 1, 1999 after extensive consultation with
stakeholders, are a step towards goal-oriented regulation.  Goal-
oriented regulation requires pipeline companies to meet
regulatory goals, as opposed to prescriptive regulation which
requires pipeline companies to perform imposed actions.
The OPR contain both prescriptive and goal-oriented
elements.  The requirement for pipelines to follow the Canadian
Standards Association (CSA) Z662 [2] is the main prescriptive
element of the OPR.  For a pipeline to be perceived to be safe it
must meet the level of safety that the Canadian public expects;eedings.asmedigitalcollection.asme.org on 06/29/2019 Terms of Use: in the view of the NEB, CSA Z662 provides a minimum level of
safety.  This means that the NEB expects its regulated
companies to provide at least the level of safety that the
prescriptive elements of CSA Z662 provide in all of their
pipeline activities, even those not specifically addressed by CSA
Z662.  The goal-oriented part of the OPR, specifically the
requirement for companies to “develop a pipeline integrity
management program” (IMP) under section 40, is intended to
assure that companies consistently apply at least this level of
safety to their pipeline system operations.
Section 40 of the OPR is supplemented by guidance notes.
The guidance notes are not regulations; they are suggestions to
companies about how they could demonstrate to the NEB that
their facilities and operations meet the standard of safety.
WHY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM AUDITS?
For pipeline companies to meet section 40 of the OPR, they
must conduct activities that identify, assess, and mitigate
hazards.  These activities must be adequate to meet their
purpose and must be carried out effectively.  
Consistency, self-evaluation, and documentation are
necessary to ensure that activities related to the IMP are
adequate and effective across the pipeline system.  As required
by the OPR, a company must periodically evaluate the
adequacy and effectiveness of its IMP.  This evaluation is
possible only if there is documentation of the intent of each
applicable activity, a procedure or description of the activity,
qualifications required to perform the activity, and a record of
the activity. 
Most NEB-regulated pipeline systems are extensive and
may be affected by a variety of hazards.  This means that many
employees with diverse backgrounds, working from
geographically remote locations, must be involved in the
execution of IMP-related activities.  Procedures and training are
necessary to ensure these employees carry out their duties in a
consistent manner.  Therefore, a company needs documented1 Copyright © 2002 by ASME
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Downloaprocedures, training requirements, and evaluation processes to
be in compliance with the OPR and to ensure that pipeline
integrity is maintained.  The NEB conducts management system
audits of its regulated companies to verify that they have this
effective documented management system.
For the prescriptive component of its regulations, the NEB
uses construction and facility inspections to verify that specific
activities are conducted in a specified manner at individual
sites.  For the goal-oriented component of its regulations, the
NEB verifies that companies are employing a comprehensive
strategy across their business to ensure that their pipelines are
safe.  This verification requires a top-down view in addition to
the bottom-up perspective of inspections. 
AUDIT PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION
To facilitate the implementation of its audit program, the
NEB conducted four gap analyses between February and July
2000.  These were “pilot audits” conducted with NEB regulated
companies to give the NEB and the participating companies an
idea of the obstacles facing the industry in moving towards a
management system approach.  The gap analyses also
introduced the NEB to the process of conducting management
system audits and identified obstacles facing the NEB in the
implementation of goal-oriented regulations.
The main issues for the NEB were a need for competent
auditors, a need to focus on management systems as opposed to
operational details, and a need for consistent acceptance
criteria.  To address the first two issues, the NEB formed an
audit team with members from a range of backgrounds and
disciplines. This team was and continues to be trained in the
methods of management system auditing.  To address the third
issue, the NEB has developed a set of elements it believes are
necessary to achieve the goal of pipeline safety. These Expected
Elements provide auditors with a guideline for the level of
safety that the NEB expects for all aspects of the design,
construction, operation, and abandonment of pipeline facilities.
They are not meant as a document telling companies how to
comply with the OPR.  In order for the Expected Elements to
fulfill their purpose of providing auditors a “measuring stick” to
gauge the level of safety of a company, they contain more
practices than the NEB might necessarily expect any individual
company to implement. 
The NEB sends the Expected Elements to a company prior
to the audit.  The intent is not for a company to change its
practices to conform to those described in the Expected
Elements.  However, a company must ensure that its practices
deal with any relevant issues addressed by the Expected
Elements.  If any issue is not applicable to the company, the
NEB does not expect the company to implement any practices
to deal with that issue.  If a given issue does apply and the
company is dealing with it in a way not described in the
Expected Elements, the company needs to be able to explain the
rationale for its practices.  The NEB will accept any practice
that provides an acceptable level of safety and may revise theded From: https://proceedings.asmedigitalcollection.asme.org on 06/29/2019 Terms of Use: Expected Elements to reflect new practices.  In this way, the
Expected Elements are an evolving, living document.
NEB EXPECTATIONS OF AN IMP
The NEB expects a company’s IMP to be comprehensive,
proactive, flexible, and continually improved (i.e., process
approach).  Maintaining pipeline integrity should be a “cradle-
to-grave” objective. Pipeline integrity must start at the design
stage and must not finish until abandonment has been
completed.  An IMP must anticipate and resolve potential issues
before they become problems.  An IMP must also be evaluated
regularly to determine what measures can be taken to improve
the program with finite human and financial resources.
The following ten elements encapsulate the NEB’s
expectations of an IMP:
Pipeline Integrity Policy and Program Scope
The NEB expects a company to direct its IMP in a manner
not unlike the way it manages its overall business.  That is, the
NEB expects top management to define and periodically review
a pipeline integrity policy to ensure it appropriately deals with
safety, environmental, and reliability risks.  The policy should
dictate the program scope.  The NEB expects the scope to cover
the entire pipeline system under the NEB’s jurisdiction.  If a
company chooses to address the integrity of its aboveground
facilities in a separate program, the IMP is expected to state this
exclusion.
Organizational Responsibilities
Once the policy and scope of the IMP have been defined,
the NEB expects a company to assign personnel who would be
accountable or responsible for developing and implementing the
various components of the IMP.  At the same time, the NEB
expects a company to allocate appropriate resources for the
IMP.  In recent years, the public has expected companies and
regulators to provide more assurance of pipeline safety and
environmental protection.
Recognizing the finite financial resources of companies in a
competitive market, the NEB expects a company to implement
a strategy whereby resources are dedicated to effectively
manage risks without sacrificing employee and public safety,
environmental protection, and reliability.  As will be noted, the
ability of a company to manage risks effectively will be greatly
enhanced if it has developed and maintained a system for the
collection and integration of relevant data.
Personnel Competency
Once personnel have been assigned responsibilities for the
development and implementation of the IMP, the NEB expects
a company to develop a system to ensure that all the personnel
are competent (i.e., knowledgeable and skilled based on
acquired education and training) and remain competent (e.g.,
via refresher training) in performing various procedures.  A
competency program should be documented and should also
ensure that personnel are kept abreast of new research,2 Copyright © 2002 by ASME
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This aspect is related to a company’s change management
program, which is discussed later in this paper.  The NEB
expects a company to measure the effectiveness of the
competency program for its employees and to make any
required adjustments.
Contractor Evaluation, Selection, and Management
The NEB recognizes that many companies obtain the
services of contractors for a variety of pipeline (including
aboveground facilities) maintenance activities.  Companies also
contract consultants with specialized or expert knowledge and
services.  The NEB expects companies to develop qualification
criteria for evaluating and selecting appropriate contractors and
consultants.  In addition, the NEB expects companies to have a
system for managing contractors to ensure that they do not
jeopardize the integrity of the pipeline system while they are in
the process of maintaining or enhancing pipeline integrity.  As
well, the NEB expects companies to have a process for
evaluating, implementing, and documenting any
recommendations provided by consultants.
Risk Assessment
A company is expected to conduct a risk assessment of its
pipeline system.  As defined by CSA Z662, risk assessment is
“the process of risk analysis and risk evaluation”.  Risk
analysis, in turn, requires an identification of potential hazards
and an estimation of the risks associated with one or more of the
hazards (e.g., corrosion, environmentally assisted cracking,
third-party damage, geo-technical issues).  A company should
examine its history of near misses and incidents, results of
inspections and operation and maintenance (O&M) activities,
and industry statistics for assistance in identifying actual and
potential hazards to its pipeline system.  Appendix B of CSA
Z662 provides guidelines for pipeline risk assessment, including
different methods that can be used for hazard identification and
risk estimation.  The NEB expects a documented and rational
risk assessment that would be used by a company to develop
and maintain its IMP.
Condition Monitoring Program
Once a company has identified and assessed risks to its
pipeline system, the NEB expects a company to develop a
program either to monitor for conditions that may jeopardize
mechanical integrity or to mitigate such conditions.  Condition
monitoring can be conducted via many different methods. These
include ground/aerial patrol, leak detection system, in-line
inspection (ILI), pressure testing, and direct assessment
methods.
The NEB neither stipulates the methods that companies
must use to monitor the conditions of its pipeline system nor the
frequencies by which the methods must be carried out.
However, the NEB expects companies to choose suitable
methods and frequencies based on established criteria, with a
full understanding of their capabilities and limitations, toded From: https://proceedings.asmedigitalcollection.asme.org on 06/29/2019 Terms of Use:provide the appropriate information about the integrity of its
pipeline system.  If a company encounters conditions where the
current best technology is either not available or not capable
(e.g., no ILI tool for detecting hook cracks along an electric
resistance welded seam on smaller diameter pipelines), the NEB
expects a company to determine the extent of the problem along
its pipeline system using alternative methods.  The NEB may
encourage the company, in this example, to fund the research
and development of a tool that would provide it with a clearer
understanding of the susceptibility or the presence of such
defects in the pipeline system.
In addition to having documented procedures for various
condition-monitoring activities, the NEB expects a company to
develop acceptance criteria for evaluating anomalies or
imperfections that may be found.
Mitigation Program
An IMP is expected to include a mitigation program to
prevent pipeline failures (i.e., leaks or ruptures) or to minimize
adverse consequences if a pipeline failure were to occur.  Table
10-1 of CSA Z662 requires a company to use only acceptable
pipeline repair methods for specific defects.  The NEB expects
a company to develop appropriate criteria for establishing
repair priorities and documented procedures, whether written by
staff or by contractors, for each repair method.  The NEB also
expects the personnel who carry out the mitigation activity to be
competent to ensure that company expectations and regulatory
requirements are met.
In addition, the NEB expects a company’s mitigation
program to include a process and/or procedure for investigating
incidents (including near misses) to determine underlying
causes so that measures can be identified and implemented to
prevent occurrences or to avoid recurrences.
Management of Change
Change is constant in the pipeline industry.  A company
may confront changes in regulations (e.g., OPR), industry
practices and standards (e.g., CSA Z662), facilities and
operations, technology, procedures, and/or personnel.  Some of
these changes may arise out of a company’s IMP and some may
affect the IMP.
The OPR require a company to develop and apply a
program to monitor and manage such changes.  The NEB has
provided guidance to companies for developing a management
of change (MOC) program.  In general, the program should
include procedures for identifying changes; methods to assess
any hazards associated with the proposed changes; and a
process for approving, implementing, communicating, and
documenting the changes.  Once developed and implemented,
the NEB expects a company to evaluate its MOC program to
ensure that it is adequate to maintain pipeline integrity so as to
protect employee and public safety and the environment.
Record Handling System3 Copyright © 2002 by ASME
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maintain various design, construction, O&M, and abandonment
records.  Beyond compliance, the NEB expects companies to
develop a record handling system to demonstrate due diligence
and the adequacy and effectiveness of its programs in ensuring
the safety of persons and the protection of the environment and
property throughout the cradle-to-grave cycle of a pipeline
system.  The OPR provide guidance to what should be included
in a record handling system.  In short, the NEB expects a record
handling system to outline what, when, and how appropriate
records are to be created, stored, retrieved, modified, and
removed (when no longer valid) in a timely manner.
The NEB does not stipulate the type of medium, platform,
or software package that companies must use to manage its
corporate data.  As with other components of the IMP, the onus
is on a company to develop a system that meets its needs, that is
used by its personnel, and that allows it to make informed
decisions to maintain the integrity and reliability of its pipeline
system.
Program Evaluation
On a regular periodic basis, the NEB expects a company to
evaluate the adequacy and effectiveness of its IMP.  This
evaluation is not unlike the periodic reviews that top
management conducts to determine whether the company is
meeting established corporate goals and objectives and whether
any changes are needed.  A company must be able to
demonstrate that it has devoted appropriate resources and has
utilized qualified personnel and procedures to manage the
integrity of its pipeline system.
The OPR require a company to conduct regular audits of its
programs.  Audits, whether internal or external, are only one
method of measuring or evaluating the adequacy and
effectiveness of the IMP.  API Standard 1160 [3] provides some
guidelines for measuring performance using leading and lagging
indicators.  The NEB also expects companies to track safety
and environmental performance indicators [4].
In the final analysis, the onus is on a company to provide a
rationale for the method(s) it uses to measure the adequacy and
effectiveness of all the expected elements and components of its
IMP.  The NEB expects that program evaluation is performed –
for safety, environmental, reliability, and business reasons.
GENERAL IMP AUDIT FINDINGS
In 2001, the NEB evaluated the IMP of six pipeline
companies.  The audit process has found the following five
general areas where companies have failed to meet the
expectations of the NEB. These areas are not an exclusive list
of issues that were found but they cover those issues that were
present in most of the audited companies. They are listed in
order of prevalence.
Insufficient documentation
Insufficient documentation was the most prevalent finding.
This documentation covered procedures and records ofed From: https://proceedings.asmedigitalcollection.asme.org on 06/29/2019 Terms of Use: activities including evaluation and follow-up.  Examples
included the following: the failure to have a documented
management system with policy, roles, and training
requirements; the failure to document corrective actions taken
to address an issue; and the failure to document the rationale for
internal inspection frequencies. 
There remains some confusion as to the level of
documentation the NEB expects.  As noted, documentation
must be able to demonstrate the adequacy and effectiveness of
the IMP.  The best way to discover the level of documentation
required is for a company to conduct self-audits as required by
section 53 of the OPR.  These self-audits should point out any
deficiencies in documentation as well as any deficiencies in
practices related to the IMP.
Lack of formal risk assessment
Another area where some companies have not been
meeting NEB expectations is risk assessment.  Companies will
often focus on certain hazards to their pipeline system and fail
to dedicate resources to address other hazards.  There is a
perception with some companies that they know the risks to
their pipeline system and therefore do not need to conduct a
formal documented risk assessment.  This may be true.
However, if companies use this knowledge to justify placing
fewer resources into mitigating a particular hazard, they will
need to demonstrate to the NEB the basis and validity of this
decision.  A formal risk assessment provides a company an
increased understanding of the nature and potential
consequences of the hazards to its pipeline integrity and,
therefore, helps to determine when and if those hazards have
been adequately mitigated.  The type and rigor of the
assessment to be carried out is best decided by the individual
company.
Inadequate management of change
As stated previously, the NEB expects companies, as per
the requirements of the OPR (section 6) and CSA Z662 (clause
10.2.1.1), to develop and apply a MOC program. Changes that
have the potential to affect pipeline system integrity can be
initiated by the company or by external stakeholders.  The
findings of the six audits conducted revealed that companies
generally have not managed changes appropriately or
effectively.  Companies had one of three shortcomings: 1) they
have not developed a formal MOC program; 2) they have not
addressed all types of changes in their MOC program; or 3)
they have not consistently applied their MOC program.  For
instance, some companies had not updated their O&M
procedures to reflect changes in regulations, industry standards,
or operating practices.  The audits also found that equipment
changes (e.g., replacement or relocation) have not always been
captured in the MOC program.
The MOC program must be able to assist a company in
identifying or recognizing changes, to review the changes, and
to approve or reject these changes.  Once the changes have been
implemented or mitigated, a company must make any4 Copyright © 2002 by ASME
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activities and O&M procedures.  The NEB expects that all
changes affecting the integrity of the pipeline system are
documented.
Inadequate evaluation of employee or contractor
competency
Competent personnel are essential for the development and
implementation of all the components of an IMP.  These
personnel include controllers who operate the pipeline system,
contract welders who perform maintenance welding on piping,
pilots who survey the pipeline right-of-way, and ILI vendors
who “smart-pig” the pipelines and glean valuable information
from the interpretation of massive data sets.  The audit findings
revealed that companies need to formalize employees’
competency programs, establish criteria for contractor
management (evaluation and selection), and develop a method
to evaluate the adequacy and effectiveness of the competency
programs.
Lack of evaluation of IMP adequacy and effectiveness
Section 53 of the OPR requires companies to conduct
regular audits and inspections of their pipeline system.  The
audits found that all companies have not carried out an
evaluation of the IMP.  Self-audits, which are an integral
component of an adequate and effective IMP, must be
sufficiently rigorous to identify any gaps in the IMP. These
include gaps in the structure, rationale, and implementation of
the IMP.  For self-audits to be effective there must be
commitment from top management and buy-in from the
company’s employees.  These audits provide management with
an assurance that the IMP is working as it should be and allow it
to correct any deficiencies before they result in incidents.
Employees benefit from these audits because they are given an
opportunity to provide feedback and to effect changes in their
day-to-day activities to assure pipeline integrity and their
personal safety.
CONCLUSION
The NEB has developed goal-oriented regulations mainly
with a twofold purpose: 1) to promote safety and environmental
protection and 2) to offer companies the flexibility to meet
those goals appropriately based on the nature and scope of their
businesses and operations and on the best available technology.
To verify company compliance with the goal-oriented OPR, the
NEB has implemented a management system audit program
based on the principles of ISO 9000 and 14000 series of
standards and a set of expected elements.
This paper has outlined the NEB’s expectations for
compliance with a goal-oriented regulation addressing pipeline
integrity. The six audits conducted in 2001 have shown the
value of management system audits in providing the NEB with
a more holistic view of companies’ programs for managing the
integrity of their pipeline systems.  As well, the audits have
pointed out potentially systemic problems that companies mustded From: https://proceedings.asmedigitalcollection.asme.org on 06/29/2019 Terms of Use:remedy across the organization and pipeline systems, not just
specific projects.
One key challenge is for companies to maintain sufficient
and appropriate documents and records.  Such records would
allow them to better assess any integrity threats on or to their
pipeline systems, make well-informed and cost-effective
decisions for monitoring and mitigating risks, and demonstrate
due diligence and the adequacy and effectiveness of their
systems and programs.  For the NEB, the key challenges
include maintaining an appropriate level of competency in the
audit team, ensuring that the audits are consistent, and avoiding
the trap of “glorified inspections” that finds faults on “trees”
and misses the holes in the “forest”. 
The NEB will continue to review, on a regular basis, its
auditing tools following each audit and, if required, update any
regulations, guidance notes, and expected elements.  The NEB
hopes regulated companies, as well as the Canadian public will
see the auditing program as a “service” that it is providing to
benefit the companies and their employees, the public, and the
environment.
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